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Abstract
We explore the effects of social influence in a simple market model in which a large number
of agents face a binary choice: ’to buy/not to buy’ a single unit of a product at a price posted
by a single seller (monopoly market). We consider the case of positive externalities: an agent
is more willing to buy if the other agents with whom he/she interacts make the same decision.
We compare two special cases known in the economics literature as the Thurstone and
the McFadden approaches. We show that they correspond to modeling the heterogenity in
individual decision rules with, respectively, annealed and quenched disorder. More precisely
the first case leads to a standard Ising model at finite temperature in a uniform external field,
and the second case to a random field Ising model (RFIM) at zero temperature.
We illustrate some dynamic properties of these models, making use of numerical simula-
tions in an ACE (Agent based Computational Economics) approach, and we study analytically
the equilibrium properties in the mean field limit.
Considering the optimisation of profit by the seller within the McFadden/RFIM model
in the mean field limit, we exhibit a new first order phase transition: if the social influence
is strong enough, there is a regime where, if the mean willingness to pay increases, or if the
production costs decrease, the optimal solution for the seller jumps from one with a high price
and a small number of buyers, to another one with a low price and a large number of buyers.
This paper has been presented at the interdisciplinary conference WEHIA 2003: it is
intended to be accessible to economists and physicists - without, hopefully, discouraging any
of them!
1 Introduction
Following Kirman [10, 11], we view a market as a complex interactive system with a
communication network. We consider a market with discrete choices [1], and explore
the effects of localised externalities (social influence) on its properties. We focus on
the simplest case: a single homogeneous product and a single seller (monopoly). On
the demand side, customers are assumed to be myopic and non strategic. The only
cognitive agent in the process is the monopolist, who determines the price in order
to optimise his profit. We obtain interesting and complex phenomena, that arise
due to the interactions between heterogeneous agents.
Agents are assumed to have idiosyncratic willingness-to-pay (IWP) which are
described by means of random variables. We consider two different models: on one
hand, the IWP are randomly chosen and remain fixed, on the other hand, the IWP
present independent temporal fluctuations around a fixed (homogeneous) value. We
will show that they correspond to statistical physics models, in the former case with
quenched disorder, and in the latter with annealed disorder. In both cases we assume
that the heterogeneous preferences of the agents are drawn from the same (logistic)
distribution. The equilibrium states of the two models generally differ, except in
the special case of homogeneous interactions with complete connectivity. In this
special situation, which corresponds to the mean-field approximation in physics, the
expected aggregate steady-state is the same in both models.
In the following, we first present the demand side, and then consider the op-
timisation problem left to the monopolist, who is assumed to know the demand
model and the distribution of the IWP over the population, but cannot observe the
individual (private) values.
2 Simple models of discrete choice with social influence
We consider a set ΩN of N agents with a classical linear IWP function [17]. Each
agent i ∈ ΩN either buys (ωi = 1) or does not buy (ωi = 0) one unit of the single
given good of the market. A rational agent chooses ωi in order to maximise his
surplus function Vi:
max
ωi∈{0,1}
Vi = max
ωi∈{0,1}
ωi(Hi +
∑
k∈ϑi
Jikωk − P ), (1)
where P is the price of one unit and Hi represents the idiosyncratic preference
component. Some other agents k within a subset ϑi ⊂ ΩN (such that k ∈ ϑi)
hereafter called neighbours of i, influence agent i’s preferences through their own
choices ωk. This social influence is represented here by a weighted sum of these
choices. Let us denote Jik the corresponding weight i.e. the marginal social influence
of the decision of agent k ∈ ϑi on agent i. When this social influence is assumed to
be positive (Jik > 0), it is possible, following Durlauf [4], to identify this external
effect as a strategic complementarity in agents’ choices [3].
For simplicity we consider here only the case of homogeneous influences, that
is, identical positive weights Jik = Jϑ and identical neighbourhood structures ϑ of
cardinal n, for all the agents. That is,
Jik = Jϑ ≡ J/n > 0 ∀i ∈ ΩN , k ∈ ϑi (2)
2.1 Psychological versus economic points of view
Depending on the nature of the idiosyncratic term Hi, the discrete choice model (1)
may represent two quite different situations. Following the typology proposed by
Anderson et al. [1], we distinguish a “psychological” and an “economic” approach
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to individual choices. Within the psychological perspective (Thurstone [23]), the
utility has a stochastic aspect because “there are some qualitative fluctuations from
one occasion to the next... for a given stimulus” (this point of view will be referred
to hereafter as the TP-model). On the contrary, for McFadden [12] each agent has
a willingness to pay that is invariable in time, but may differ from one agent to
the other. In a “risky” situation the seller cannot observe each specific IWP, but
knows its statistical distribution over the population (we call this perspective the
McF-model). Accordingly, the TP and the McF perspectives differ in the nature of
the individual willingness to pay.
In the TP model, the idiosyncratic preference has two sub-components: a con-
stant deterministic term H (the same for all the agents), and a time- and agent-
dependent additive term ǫi(t), so that Hi = H + ǫi. The ǫi(t) are i.i.d. random
variables of zero mean; in the simulations they are refreshed at each time step
(asynchronous updating). Agent i decides to buy according to the conditional prob-
ability
P (ωi = 1|zi(P,H)) = P(ǫi > zi(P,H)) = 1− F (zi(P,H)), (3)
with
zi(P,H) = P −H − Jϑ
∑
k∈ϑi
ωk, (4)
where F (zi) = P(ǫi ≤ zi) is the cumulative distribution of the random variables ǫi.
In the standard TP model, the agents make repeated choices, and the time varying
components ǫi(t) are drawn at each time t from a logistic distribution with zero
mean, and variance σ2 = π2/(3β2):
F (z) =
1
1 + exp(−β z) . (5)
In the McF model, the private idiosyncratic terms Hi are randomly distributed
over the agents, but remain fixed during the period under consideration. There are
no temporal variations: the ǫi are strictly zero. In analogy with the TP model, it
is useful to introduce the following notation: Hi = H + θi, and to assume that the
θi are logistically distributed with zero mean and variance σ
2 = π2/(3β2) over the
population. This assumption implies:
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
θi = 0 and lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
Hi = H. (6)
Thus, the correspondence between models is better the larger the number of agents,
and is strict only in the limit of an infinite population. In practice, the simulations
presented in the following sections show that the theoretical predictions are already
verified for population sizes of the order of some hundreds.
For a given distribution of choices in the neighbourhood ϑi, and for a given price,
the customer’s behaviour in the McF model is deterministic. An agent buys if:
θi > P −H − Jϑ
∑
k∈ϑi
ωk. (7)
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2.2 ‘Annealed’ versus ‘quenched’ disorder
Since we have assumed isotropic (hence symmetric) interactions, there is a strong
relation between these models and Ising type models in Statistical Mechanics, which
is made explicit if we change the variables ωi ∈ {0, 1} into spin variables si ∈ {±1}
through ωi =
1+si
2 . All the expressions in the present paper can be put in terms
of either si or ωi using this transformation. In the following we keep the encoding
ωi ∈ {0, 1}. The assumption of strategic complementarity in economics corresponds
to having ferromagnetic couplings in physics (that is, the interaction J between Ising
spins is positive). In this case, the spins si (and consequently the choices ωi) all tend
to take the same value.
In physics, the TP model corresponds to a case of annealed disorder. Having a
time varying random idosyncratic component is equivalent to introducing a stochas-
tic dynamics for the Ising spins. In the particular case where F (z) in (3) is the
logistic distribution, we obtain an Ising model in a uniform (non random) external
field H − P , at temperature T = 1/β. The McF model has fixed heterogeneity; it
is analogous to a Random Field Ising Model (RFIM) at zero temperature, that is,
with deterministic dynamics. The RFIM belongs to the class of quenched disorder
models: the values Hi are equivalent to random time-independent local fields. The
“agreement” among agents favored by the ferromagnetic couplings may be broken
by the influence of these heterogeneous external fields Hi. Due to the random distri-
bution of Hi over the network of agents, the resulting organisation may be complex.
Thus, from the physicist’s point of view, the TP and the McF models are quite
different: uniform field and finite temperature in the former, random field and zero
temperature in the latter. The properties of disordered systems have been and still
are the subject of numerous studies in statistical physics. They show that annealed
and quenched disorder can lead to very different behaviours.
The TP model is well understood. In the case where the agents are situated on
the vertices of a 2-dimensional square lattice, and have four neighbours each, there
is an exact analysis of the model for P = Pn (the unbiased case, (33), see below)
due to Onsager [14]. Even if an analytical solution of the optimization problem
(1) for an arbitrary neighbourhood does not exist, the mean field analysis gives
approximate results that become exact in the limiting situation where every agent
is a neighbour of every other agent (i.e. all the agents are interconnected through
weights (2)). On the contrary, the properties of the McF model are not yet fully
understood. A number of important results have been published in the physics
literature since the first studies of the RFIM by Aharony and Galam [6, 7] (see also
[5], [21]). Several variants of the RFIM have already been used in the context of
socio-economic modelling [8, 15, 2, 24].
2.3 Static versus dynamic points of view
Hereafter, we restrict our investigation to the McF model in the case of a “global”
externality. That is, we consider homogeneous interactions and full connectivity,
which is equivalent to the mean field model in physics. Within this general frame-
work, we are interested in two different perspectives. First we consider a static point
of view: solving for the equality between demand and supply we determine the set
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of possible economic equilibria. This will allow us to analyse in section 4 the optimal
strategy of the monopolist, as a function of the model parameters.
Next (section 5) we consider the market’s dynamics assuming myopic and non
strategic agents: based on the observation of the behaviour of the other agents at
time t − 1, each agent decides at time t to buy or not to buy. We show that, in
general, the market converges towards the static equilibria of the preceding section,
except for a precise range of the parameter values where interesting static as well as
dynamic features are observed.
These two kinds of analysis correspond in Physics to the study of the thermal
equilibrium properties within the statistical ensemble framework on the one hand,
and the out of equilibrium dynamics (which, in most cases, approaches the static
equilibrium through a relaxation process) on the other hand, respectively.
3 Aggregate demand
As discussed in the preceding section, we consider the full connectivity case with
isotropic interactions given by (2) with cardinal n = N − 1, in the limit of a very
large number of agents. In this limit the penetration rate η, defined as the fraction
of customers that choose to buy at a given price: η ≡ limN→∞
∑N
k=1 ωk/N , can be
approximated by η ≈∑k∈ϑ ωk/(N −1), which is proportional to the social influence
term of the agents’ surplus function (eq. (1)). Equation (7) may thus be replaced
by
θi > P −H − J η. (8)
For the following discussion it is convenient to identify the marginal customer, indif-
ferent between buying and not buying. Let Hm = H+θm be his IWP. This marginal
customer has zero surplus (Vm = 0), that is:
θm = P −H − J η ≡ z. (9)
Thus, an agent i buys if θi > θm, and does not buy otherwise. Equations (8) and
(9) allow us to obtain η as a fixed point:
η = 1− F (z) (10)
where z, defined in (9) depends on P , H, and η, and F (z) is the cumulative distribu-
tion of the IWP around the average value H. Note that this (macroscopic) equation
is formally equivalent to the (microscopic) individual expectation that ωi = 1 in the
TP case (3). Using the logistic distribution for θi, we have:
η =
1
1 + exp (+β z)
(11)
Equation (10) allows us to define η as an implicit function of the price through
Φ(η, P ) ≡ η(P ) + F (P −H − J η(P ))− 1 = 0. (12)
The shape of this (implicit) demand curve can be evaluated using the implicit deriva-
tive theorem:
dη(P )
dP
=
−∂Φ/∂P
∂Φ/∂η
=
−f(z)
1− J f(z) (13)
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where f(z) = dF (z)/dz is the probability density.
Since for a given P , equation (11) defines the penetration rate η as a fixed-point,
inversion of this equation gives an inverse demand function:
P d(η) = H + J η +
1
β
ln
1− η
η
(14)
At given values of β, J and H, for most values of P , (11) has a unique solution
η(P ). However for βJ > βJB ≡ 4, there is a range of prices
P1(βJ, βH) < P < P2(βJ, βH) (15)
such that, for any P in this interval, (11) has two stable solutions and an unstable
one. The limiting values P1 and P2 are the particular price values obtained from
the condition that eq. (11) has one degenerate solution:
η = 1− F (z), and d(1− F (z))
dη
= 1.
This gives βJη(1−η) = 1 (together with eq. (11)). This equation has two solutions,
η2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ η1,
ηi =
1
2
[
1±
√
1− 4
βJ
]
; i ∈ {1, 2} (16)
Note that ηi depends only on βJ . Then, the limiting prices Pi are equal to the
inverse demands associated with these values ηi, which are, from (14):
Pi = H + Jηi +
1
β
ln[
1− ηi
ηi
] ; i ∈ {1, 2}. (17)
Note that these limiting prices are not necessarily positive.
It is interesting to note that the set of equilibria is the same as what would be
obtained if agents had rational expectations about the choices of the others: if every
agent had knowledge of the distribution of the Hi, he could compute the equilibrium
state compatible with the maximisation of his own surplus, taking into account that
every agent does the same, and make his decision (to buy/not to buy) accordingly.
For βJ < βJB every agent could thus anticipate the value of η to be realized at
the price P , and make his choice according to (8). For βJ > βJB , however, if the
price is set within the interval [P1, P2], the agents are unable to anticipate which
equilibrium will be realized, even though the one with the largest value of η should
be preferred by every one (it is the Pareto dominant equilibrium).
4 Supply side
On the supply side, we consider a monopolist facing heterogeneous customers in a
risky situation where the monopolist has perfect knowledge of the functional form
of the agents’ surplus functions and the maximisation behaviour (1). He also knows
the statistical (logistic) distribution of the idiosyncratic part of the reservation prices
(Hi). In the special case of global externality considered here, where the interactions
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are the same for all customers, as in equation (2) with n = N−1, as just seen, the TP
model and the McF one have the same equilibrium states. Indeed, the monopolist
cannot observe any individual reservation price. He observes only the cumulated
result of the individual choices (which are either to buy or not to buy). As a result,
the conditional probability for an agent taken at random by the monopolist to be
a customer is formally equivalent in both cases. Accordingly, hereafter we limit
ourselves to the case where the demand follows the McF model, in the limit of full
connectivity. The social influence on each individual decision is then close to J η,
and the fraction of customers η is observed by the monopolist. That is, for a given
price, the expected number of buyers is given by equation (10).
4.1 Profit maximisation
Let C be the monopolist cost for each unit sold, so that
p ≡ P − C (18)
is his profit per unit. Since P −H = (P − C)− (H − C), defining
h ≡ H −C, (19)
we can rewrite z in (4) as:
z = p − h − J η. (20)
Hereafter we write all the equations in terms of p and h.
Since each customer buys a single unit of the good, the monopolist’s total ex-
pected profit is p N η. Thus, in this mean field case, the monopolist’s profit is
proportional to the total number of customers. He is left with the following max-
imisation problem:
pM = argmax
p
Π(p), (21)
where N Π(p) is the expected profit, with:
Π(p) ≡ p η(p), (22)
and η(p) is the solution to the implicit equation (10). If there is no discontinuity in
the demand curve η(p) (hence for βJ ≤ 4), pM satisfies dΠ(p)/dp = 0, which gives
dη/dp = −η/p at p = pM . Using the implicit derivative (13), we obtain at p = pM :
f(z)
1− Jf(z) =
η
p
, (23)
where z, defined in (20), has to be taken at p = pM .
Because the monopolist observes the demand level η, we can use equation (10)
to replace 1− F (z) by η. After some manipulations, equation (23) gives an inverse
supply function ps(η):
ps(η) =
1
β (1− η) − J η (24)
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We obtain pM and ηM as the intersection between supply (24) and demand (14):
pM = p
s(ηM ) = p
d(ηM ), (25)
where pd ≡ P d − C.
The (possibly local) maxima of the profit are the solutions of (25) for which
d2Π
dp2
< 0. (26)
It is straightforward to get the expression for the second derivative of the profit:
d2Π
dp2
= −2η
p
[
1 +
2η − 1
2βp(1 − η)2
]
, (27)
from which it is clear that the solutions with η > 1/2 are local maxima. For η < 1/2,
condition (26) reads
1− 2η
2βp(1− η)2 < 1. (28)
Making use of the above equations, this can also be rewritten as
2βJη(1 − η)2 < 1. (29)
For βJ > βJB = 4, the monopolist has to find p = pM which realises the
programme:
pM : max{Π−(pM− ),Π+(pM+ )} (30)
pM+ = argmaxp
Π+(p) ≡ p η+(p), (31)
pM− = argmaxp
Π−(p) ≡ p η−(p) (32)
where the subscripts + and − refer to the solutions of (11) with a fraction of buyers
larger, respectively smaller, than 1/2.
To illustrate the behaviour of these equations, figure 1 represents several exam-
ples of inverse supply and demand curves corresponding to different market config-
urations.
4.2 Phase transition in the monopolist’s strategy
In this section we analyse and discuss the solution of the optimal supply-demand
static equilibria, that is, the solutions of equations (25) and (29). As might be
expected, the result for the product βpM depends only on the two parameters βh
and βJ . That is, the variance of the idiosyncratic part of the reservation prices fixes
the scale of the important parameters, and in particular that of the optimal price.
Let us first discuss the case where h > 0. It is straightforward to check that in
this case there is a single solution ηM . It is interesting to compare the value of pM
with the value pn corresponding to the neutral situation on the demand side. The
latter corresponds to the unbiased situation where the willingness to pay is neutral
on average: there are as many agents likely to buy as not to buy (η = 1/2). Since
8
Figure 1: Inverse supply and demand curves ps(η) and pd(η), for different values of h and J (β = 1,
C = 0 hence h = H). The equilibrium prices are obtained at the intersection between the demand (black)
and the supply (grey) curves.
The two graphics on top illustrate the difference between a complete absence of externality (J = 0, dashed
lines) and a strong externality (J = 4, solid lines). The case h = 2 (left) corresponds to a strong positive
average of the population’s IWP (h = 2), whereas the population is neutral for h = 0 (right).
The four graphics labelled (a) to (d) were obtained for values of h and J corresponding to the points (a)
to (d) in the phase diagram (figure 3). They all have negative values of the average of the population’s
IWP (h < 0), so that in the absence of externality only few consumers would be interested in the single
commodity.
(a) corresponds to the coexistence region between two local market equilibria in figure 3; but one of them
(not shown) is not relevant since it corresponds to a negative price solution. (b) lies in the coexistence region;
in this case, the optimal market equilibrium is the one with high η. (c) lies in the region with only one
market equilibrium, with few buyers (small η). (d) corresponds to a large social effect; the single market
equilibrium has large η and a high price.
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Figure 2: Fraction of buyers η, optimal price βpM and monopolist profit ΠM , as a function of the
social influence, for βh = −2. The superscripts − and + refer to the two solutions of equations (25) that
are relative maxima.
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β h
β J
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(a)
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(d)
Figure 3: Phase diagram in the plane {βJ, βh}: the grey region represents the domain in the parameter
space where coexist two maxima of the monopolist’s profit, a global one (the optimal solution) and a local
one. Inside this domain, as βJ and/or βh increase, there is a (first order) transition where the monopolist’s
optimum jumps from a high price, low penetration rate solution η = η
−
to one with low price, large η = η+.
The circles on the transition line have been obtained numerically, the smooth curves are obtained analytically
(see the Appendix and [13] for details). The points (a) to (d) correspond to the inverse supply and demand
curves represented in figure 1. In the white region, for βJ < 27/8, the fraction of buyers, η, increases
continuously from 0 to 1 as βh increases from −∞ to +∞ (c-d). At the singular point A, (βJ = 27/8,
βh = −3/4 − log(2)), η+ = η− = 1/3. At point B (βJ = 4, βh = −2), the local maximum with η large
appears with a null profit and η+ = 1/2. In the dark-grey region below B, this local maximum exists with
a negative profit, being thus non viable for the monopolist (a).
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the expected willingness to pay of any agent i is h + θi + J/2 − p, its average over
the set of agents is h+ J/2− p. Thus, the neutral state is obtained for
pn = h+ J/2. (33)
To compare pM with pn, it is convenient to rewrite equation (14) as
β(pd − pn) = βJ(η − 1/2) + ln[(1− η)/η]. (34)
This equation gives pd = pn for η = 0.5, as it should. For this value of η, equation
(24) gives ps = pn only if β(h+ J) = 2: for these values of J and h, the monopolist
maximises his profit when the buyers represent half of the population. When β(h+
J) increases above 2 (decreases below 2), the monopolist’s optimal price decreases
(increases) and the corresponding fraction of buyers increases (decreases).
Finally, if there are no social effects (J = 0) the monopolist optimal price is a
solution of the implicit equation:
pM =
1
β F (pM − h) =
1 + exp (−β(pM − h))
β
. (35)
The value of βpM lies between 1 and 1 + exp(βh). Increasing β lowers the optimal
price: since the variance of the distribution of willingness to pay gets smaller, the
only way to keep a sufficient number of buyers is to lower the prices.
Consider now the case with h < 0, that is, on average the population is not willing
to buy. Due to the randomness of the individual’s reservation price, Hi = H + θi,
the surplus may be positive but only for a small fraction of the population. Thus, we
would expect that the monopolist will maximise his profit by adjusting the price to
the preferences of this minority. However, this intuitive conclusion is not supported
by the solution to equations (25) when the social influence represented by J is strong
enough. The optimal monopolist’s strategy shifts abruptly from a regime of high
price and a small fraction of buyers to a regime of low price with a large fraction of
buyers as βJ increases. Such a discontinuity may actually be expected for βJ > 4 =
βJB , that is when the demand itself has a discontinuity. But, quite interestingly,
the transition is also found in the range βJA ≡ 27/8 < βJ < 4 == βJB , that is,
in a domain of the parameters space (βJ, βh) where the demand η(p) is a smooth
function of the price.
Such a transition is analogous to what is called a first order phase transition in
physics [22]: the fraction of buyers jumps at a critical value of the control parameter
βJc(βh) from a low to a high value. Before the transition, above a value βJ−(βh) <
βJc(βh) equations (25) already present several solutions. Two of them are local
maxima of the monopolist’s profit function, and one corresponds to a local minimum.
The global maximum is the solution corresponding to a high price with few buyers
for βJ < βJc, and that of low price with many buyers for βJ > βJc. Figure 2
presents these results for the particular value βh = −2, for which it can be shown
analytically that βJ− = 4, and βJc ≈ 4.17 (determined numerically).
The detailed discussion of the full phase diagram in the plane {βJ, βh}, shown
on Figure 3, is presented in the Appendix, and a more general discussion will be
presented elsewhere [13].
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5 Dynamic features
In this class of models, the individual threshold of adoption implicitly embodies
the number of agents each individual considers sufficient to modify his behaviour, as
underlined in the field of social science [20, 9]. We briefly discuss here some dynamic
aspects, considering a market dynamics with myopic customers: an agent makes its
decision at time t based on the observation of the behaviour of other agents at time
t − 1. The adoption by a single agent in the population (a “direct adopter”) may
then lead to a significant change in the whole population through a chain reaction
of “indirect adopters” [17].
Within the McF model, the dynamics for the fraction of adopters in the large N
limit is then given by
η(t) = 1− F (P −H − J η(t− 1)) (36)
and η(t) converges to a solution of the fixed point equation (10). As we have seen,
given J , H and P , two stable and one unstable fixed points appear in (10) for values
of β large enough (small σ). The stable solutions correspond to two possible levels
of η at a given price (Figure 4a). Varying the price smoothly, a transition may
be observed between these phases. The jump in the number of buyers occurs at
different price values according to whether the price increases or decreases, leading
to hysteresis loops. In some cases, the number of customers evolves through a series
of clustered flips (between ωi = 1 and ωi = 0), called avalanches. For small values
of β (large σ), there is a single fixed point for all values of P , and no hysteresis at
all ( [17, 18]).
a - Hysteresis in the trade-off between prices b - Chronology and sizes of induced effects
and customers: upstream (black) in an avalanche at the phase
and downstream (grey) trajectories transition for P = 1.2408 (Pn = 1.25)
Figure 4: Discontinuous phase transition (full connectivity, synchronous activation regime; source: Phan
et al. [17]; parameters: N = 1296, H = 1, J = 0.5, β = 10).
The curves in Figure 4a, represent the number of customers as a function of the
price, obtained through a simulation of the whole demand system. The black (grey)
curve corresponds to the “upstream” (downstream) trajectory, when prices decrease
(increase) in steps of 10−4, within the interval [0.9, 1.6]. We observe a hysteresis
phenomenon with discontinuous transitions around the theoretical point of symme-
try, Pn = 1.25. Typically, along the downstream trajectory (with increasing prices,
grey curve) the externality effect induces a strong resistance of the demand system
against a decrease in the number of customers. In both cases, large avalanches occur
at the so-called “first order phase transition”. Figure 4b represents the sizes of these
dramatic induced effects as a function of time (see [17, 18] for more details).
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared two extreme special cases of discrete choice mod-
els, the McFadden (McF) and the Thurstone (TP) models, in which the individuals
bear a local positive social influence on their willingness to pay, and have random
heterogeneous idiosyncratic preferences. In the McF model the latter remain fixed,
and give rise to a complex market organisation. For physicists, this model with fixed
heterogeneity belongs to the class of ‘quenched’ disorder models; the McF model is
equivalent to a ‘Random Field Ising Model’ (RFIM). In the TP model, all the agents
share a homogeneous part of willingness to pay, but have an additive, time varying,
random (logistic) idiosyncratic characteristic. In physics, this problem corresponds
to a case of ‘annealed’ disorder. In the TP model, the random idiosyncratic com-
ponent is equivalent to having a stochastic dynamics, because each agent decides
to buy according to the logit choice function, making this model formally equiva-
lent to an Ising model at temperature T 6= 0 in a uniform (non random) external
field. From the physicist’s point of view, the McF and TP models are quite different:
random field and zero temperature in the McF case, uniform field and non zero tem-
perature in the TP case. An important result in statistical physics is that quenched
and annealed disorders can lead to very different behaviours. In this paper we have
discussed some consequences on the market’s behaviour.
Considering that the seller optimises his own profit, we have exhibited a new ‘first
order phase transition’: when the social influence is strong enough, there is a regime
where, upon increasing the mean willingness to pay, or decreasing the production
costs, the optimal monopolist’s solution jumps from one with a high price and a
small number of buyers, to one with a low price and a large number of buyers.
We have only considered fully connected systems: the theoretical analysis of
systems with finite connectivity is more involved, and requires numerical simulations.
The simplest configuration is one where each customer has only two neighbours, one
on each side. The corresponding network, which has the topology of a ring, has been
analysed numerically by Phan et al. [17]) who show that the optimal monopolist’s
price increases both with the degree of the connectivity graph and the range of the
interactions (in particular, in the case of small worlds). Buyers’ clusters of different
sizes may form, so that it is no longer possible to describe the externality with
a single parameter, like in the mean field case. Further studies in computational
economics are required in order to explore such situations.
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Appendix: Phase Diagram
In this Appendix we detail the derivation of the phase diagram in the plane (βJ ,
βh), presented in figure 3. The phase diagram shows the domain in the parameter
space where coexist two maxima of the monopolist’s profit, one global maximum
(the optimal solution) and one local maximum. Inside this domain there is a (first
order) transition line where, as βJ and/or βh increases, the optimal solution jumps
from a solution ’-’ with a low value η = η− to a solution ’+’ with a large value
η = η+, η being the fraction of buyers. In figure 3, the circles ’o’ are points on the
transition line obtained numerically; all the other curves being obtained analytically
as explained below.
In the following without loss of generality we set β = 1, which is equivalent to
say that we measure J and h in units of 1/β.
To explain the phase diagram in more detail, it is convenient to parametrise
every quantity/curve as a function of η. First the (per unit) profit p is given by
p =
1
1− η − Jη (37)
(hence the profit NΠ = Np(η)η), and η is a fixed point of the equation
η = G(h, J, η) (38)
with
G(h, J, η) =
1
1 + exp(−h− 2Jη + 11−η )
(39)
We will also make use of an alternative form of (38), (39), that is
h = −2Jη + 1
1− η + log(
η
1− η ) (40)
One can also show that the fixed point equation (38) is equivalent to
d(ηP d(η))
dη
= 0, (41)
and that the condition for having a maximum, (27), is equivalent to
d(ηP s(η))
dη
> 0. (42)
As we will see, there are two singular points of interest:
A: JA = 27/8, hA = −3/4− log(2);
B: JB = 4, hB = −2.
Let us describe the phase diagram considering that, at fixed J , one increases h
starting from some low (strongly negative) value.
If J < 27/8 = JA, the optimal solution changes continuously, the fraction of
buyers increasing with no discontinuity from a low to a high value as h increases.
More generally, outside the grey domain in figure 3 there is a unique solution of the
optimisation of the profit.
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For J > 27/8 = JA, as h increases one will first hit the lower boundary of the
grey region on the phase diagram, h = h−(J). On this line, a local maximum of
the profit appears, corresponding to a value η = η+ > 1/3. As shown in figure
5a , the curve y = G(h, J, η) intersects y = η at some small value η = η− and is
tangent to it at η = η+. For h−(J) < h < h+(J) y = G(h, J, η) has three intersects
with the diagonal y = η, h = h+(J) being the upper boundary of the grey region
on the phase diagram. The stability analysis shows that the two extreme intersects
correspond to maxima of the profit, giving the solutions η = η− and η = η+. On
the upper boundary h = h+(J), it is the solution with a small value of η which
disappears, with y = G(h, J, η) becoming tangent to y = η for η = η−, see figures
5c1 and 5c2. These lower and upper boundaries are obtained by writing that the
second derivative of the profit with respect to p is zero, giving
2Jη(1 − η)2 = 1 (43)
Together with (40) this gives the curves parametrised by η,
J =
1
2η(1 − η)2
h = − 1
(1− η)2 +
1
1− η + log(
η
1− η ) (44)
the lower curve h−(J) corresponding to the branch η = η+ ∈ [1/3, 1], and the upper
curve h+(J) corresponding to the branch η = η− ∈ [0, 1/3].
The two curves merge at the singular point A, at which η+ = η− = 1/3, JA =
27/8, hA = −3/4− log(2). Expanding the above equations (44) near η = 1/3 we find
that the two curves are cotangent at A, with a slope −2/3. This common tangent
is thus also tangent to the transition line at A. A straight segment of slope −2/3
starting from A is plotted on the phase diagram, figure 3, and one can see that this
is a very good approximation of the transition line for J < 4 = JB .
On the lower boundary, for J > 4 = JB , the local maximum with η = η+ appears
with a negative profit (zero profit at point B where η+ = 1/2). The profit becomes
positive on the curve starting at point B, on which the profit is zero with η+ > 1/2.
This curve is obtained by writing p = 0, η+ > 1/2, that is,
η+ =
1
2
[
1 +
√
1− 4
J
]
(45)
and h is obtained as a function of J , by replacing η in (40) by the above expression
(45). In this domain of negative profit for the local maximum, the distance to the
transition line (at a given value of J) is equal to the amount by which the production
cost per unit of good must be lowered in order to make the solution viable.
In the domain J > 4 = JB , the transition line, computed numerically, appears to
be just above this null profit line. This suggests that an expansion for p small for the
solution η+, and for η small for the solution η− should provide good approximations.
The transition is obtained when Π+ = Π− as explained below, and this allows to
display the curve of figure 3, which turns out to be a very good approximation of
the transition line for large values of J (or small values of h, typically h < −4.5).
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Let us first consider the vicinity of the point B at which p+ = 0, η+ = 1/2,
and the second derivative of the profit is zero for this ’+’ local solution. Expanding
near J = 4, h just above h−(4) = −2 (p small), one gets the behaviour of the ’+’
solution:
ǫ ≡ h+ 2, 0 < ǫ << 1
η+ =
1
2
(1 +
√
ǫ
2
)
p+ = ǫ+ o(ǫ
3/2)
Π+ =
ǫ
2
+ o(ǫ3/2) (46)
The singular, square-root, behaviour of η is specific to point B. For any J > 4, just
above the null curve η+ increases linearly with ǫ ≡ h − h−(J), but with a similar
behaviour as for J = 4 for the price and the profit, at lowest order in ǫ: denoting
by η0+(J) the value η+(h−(J)),
0 < ǫ = h− h−(J) << 1
η+ = η
0
+(J) + ǫ
η0+(1− η0+)2
1− 2Jη0+(1− η0+)2
p+ = ǫ,
Π+ = η
0
+(J) ǫ. (47)
One can see from the expression of η+ in (47) how the singularity at point B appears:
the coefficient of ǫ diverges when condition (43) is fulfilled, that is when the solution
is marginally stable, which is the case at B.
Similarly one can get the behaviour of the ’+’ solution near point B at h = −2,
increasing J from J = 4, as shown in figure 2
η+ =
1
2
(1 +
√
J − 4
2
)
p+ =
1
2
(J − 4) +
√
2
12
(J − 4)3/2
Π+ =
1
4
(J − 4) + 1
3
√
2
(J − 4)3/2 (48)
Coming back to the behaviour at a given value of J , one can get an approximation
of the ’-’ solution. The fixed point equation for η for given values of J and h, is
η = H(η) ≡ 1/
[
1 + exp (1− h− 2Jη + η
1− η )
]
(49)
The ’-’ solution corresponding to a small value of η can be found by iterating
η(k + 1) = H(η(k)) starting with η(0) = 0, and η(k) is an increasing sequence
of approximations of η−. The lowest non trivial order is then given by
η0− = H(0) = 1/ [1 + exp (1− h)] (50)
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which is indeed small for h strongly negative. At the next order
η1− = H(η
0
−) (51)
Taking η0− as the small parameter, the expansion of η
1
− gives
η1− = η
0
−(1 + (2J − 1)η0−) (52)
and this gives the corresponding approximations for the price and the profit,
p1− = 1− (J − 1)η0−
Π1− = η
0
− + J(η
0
−)
2. (53)
It is clear from the above equation that the dependency on J is weak since η0−
is small, in agreement with the exact behaviour computed numerically, shown on
figure 2.
Now we consider the neighbourhood of (J, h−(J)), that is h = h−(J) + ǫ. De-
noting by η0(J) the value of η
0
− at h = h−(J), η
0
−(h) = η0(J) + ǫη0(J)(1 − η0(J)).
Taking this expression for computing the profit of the ’-’ solution, and writing that
at the transition the two solutions ’+’ and ’-’ give the same profit, one gets the
following approximation for the value ǫc(J) of ǫ at the transition (hence the value
of h at the transition, hc(J) = h−(J) + ǫc(J)):
ǫc(J) =
η0(J)
η+(J)
(54)
where η+(J) is given by equation (47). It is this curve hc(J) = h−(J)+ ǫc(J) which
is plotted in figure 3 for J > JB = 4.
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Figure 5: Functions y = G(h, J, η), y = η, price p(η) and profit Π(η) (+−). The intersects of y = G(h, J, η)
with y = η give the extrema of the profit; the (possibly local) maxima are those for which dΠ/dη > 0. Shown
here are marginal cases where for one solution dΠ/dη = 0, that is y = G(h, J, η) is tangent to y = η (points
on the lower or upper curves of the phase diagram, figure 3).
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